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use of traditional remedies, unless there existed only a slight possibility of
such remedies being adequate to effectuate the policies of the Act.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fifth Circuit seems to have read the Gissel opinion with greater
insight than the Board. While the Board correctly notes that employer
misconduct should not go unpunished, it appears to place minimal sig-
nificance in the Court's directive that employee sentiment must also be
protected in determining the advisability of issuing a bargaining order,
and that employee sentiment is not a secondary goal, but one equal to that
of punishment and deterrence of employer misconduct. The Board also
seems to lose sight of the fact that Gissel called for the use of traditional
remedies rather than a bargaining order, if traditional remedies could be
effective. The court of appeals did not question the validity of the order in
Gibson, but merely asked for greater specificity of findings to determine if
the issuance of the bargaining order would meet the Gissel criteria. Thus,
the Board seems to be in conflict with the Supreme Court's guidance for
fashioning a remedy when it concludes that it must never look beyond
the original unfair labor practices that precipitate a dissolution of what
otherwise would have been majority status.
There would seem to be little doubt that when the Board calls upon the
Fifth Circuit to enforce its 1970 aflrmance of the 1968 order, the court
will again refuse to enforce the order because of the Board's pointed
repudiation of American Cable. This does not preclude the possibility that
the District of Columbia Circuit, or one of the other circuits, would en-
force a decision such as Gibson on the basis of the Board's reasoning. Of
course if the Board and the courts of appeals continue to disagree as to
the proper application of the Gissel criteria in imposing a bargaining order,
it is possible that the Supreme Court will entertain another case such as
Gibson in order to provide greater illumination into the teachings of Gissel.
Dennis R. Lewis
United States v. Prudden: An Application of Miranda
To Tax Fraud Investigations
Defendant, a fifty-year-old businessman and law school graduate, was
selected by the Internal Revenue Service to be the subject of a tax audit.
The revenue agent initially conducting the audit found indications of
fraud and reported his find to the Intelligence Division of the Internal
Revenue Service. A special agent was then assigned to the case. At his first
meeting with the defendant, the special agent identified himself as such
and showed the defendant his credentials.' Up to this point and during sub-
' The revenue agent told Prudden from the outset that the investigation was not routine, that
the returns had been selected. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 831 (1970).
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sequent meetings the defendant was never made aware by the special agent
that a criminal investigation was being conducted. Defendant was never
given any of the warnings enunciated in Miranda v. Arizona All of the
meetings between the defendant and the Internal Revenue agents, extend-
ing over some fifteen months, were conducted at the defendant's con-
venience on generally amicable terms.' Defendant was ultimately indicted
for tax fraud. The district court entered an order suppressing evidence
furnished by the defendant after the entry of the special agent into the
case on the grounds that the evidence was obtained by a deliberate scheme
to deceive Prudden in order to prevent his understanding that the investi-
gation had been materially altered at the time the special agent entered
the case.4 The Government appealed the order. Held, reversed: Miranda
warnings are not required in tax investigations where the taxpayer is not
deprived of his freedom and is not actually compelled or coerced into
furnishing statements or documents. United States v. Prudden, 424 F.2d
1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
I. MIRANDA v. ARIZONA: PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION
In Miranda v. Arizona' the United States Supreme Court recognized
that an individual's fifth amendments right against self-incrimination was
in such danger of being violated by police compulsion in custodial interro-
gations that procedural safeguards had to be set up to secure this right.
The Court's reasoning was based on the conviction that the very nature
and purpose of police interrogation techniques was the eliciting of confes-
sions: "It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for
no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his exami-
ner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of intimidation."" The Court
pointed out that such techniques were psychologically rather than physi-
cally oriented.8 The Court concluded that without proper safeguards an
individual would thus have his will to resist undermined and hence be
compelled to speak.' Therefore, for an individual to be able to exercise his
constitutional right against self-incrimination in such an atmosphere he
must first be made aware of such right, and second have an opportunity
to effectively exercise his option to preserve this right.1"
There has been much discussion and debate as to whether under the
Miranda doctrine the one interrogated must actually be in custody before
2384 U.S. 436 (1966).
' The evidence in question was obtained prior to the decision in Miranda, but the Supreme
Court has ruled that Miranda is applicable where the trial begins after June 13, 1966. Johnson v.
New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 734 (1966).
"United States v. Prudden, 305 F. Supp. 110 (M.D. Fla. 1969).
5384 U.S. 436 (1966).
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
7384 U.S. at 457.
8 Id. at 448.
9 id. at 467.
'Old. at 478-79.
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the warnings are required." Under a strict interpretation of Miranda, an
individual must be taken into custody or deprived of his freedom of action
before the warnings must be given.12 The advocates of such a view look
directly to the Miranda holding:
[T]he prosecution may not use statements . . . stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless [the prosecution] demonstrates the use
of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-
incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or other-
wise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way."'
Those interpreting Miranda differently point to what they feel to be the
underlying theory of the decision. Their argument is that the Court's
primary consideration was the initiation of the adversary process and that
custody was merely the point at which such initiation could be identified:14
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be
given to the privilege against self-incrimination when the individual is first
subjected to police interrogation while in custody at the station or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. It is at this point
that our adversary system of criminal proceedings commences . . . . [T]he
safeguards to be erected about this privilege must come into play at this
point.'5
This view would not limit Miranda to custody situations but would re-
quire its warnings upon the initiation of the adversary process."
II. APPLYING MIRANDA TO TAX FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS
Tax fraud investigations are criminal in nature and thus theoretically
come within the holding in Miranda. The difficulty is that the investigative
process begins as a civil proceeding and may switch to a criminal one
without the suspect's knowing of the change. The IRS begins its investiga-
n Andrews, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Tax Investigations Under Escobedo and Miranda:
The "Critical Stage," 53 IOwA L. Ruv. 1074, 1075 n.7 (1968); Wright, The New Role of De-
fense Counsel Under Escobedo and Miranda, 52 A.B.A.J. 1117 (1966).
" See United States v. Brevik, 422 F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1970) (the court held that non-custodial
tax investigations required no Miranda warnings); United States v. Browney, 421 F.2d 48 (4th
Cir. 1970) (Miranda warnings were not required when the taxpayer was not in custody or de-
prived of his freedom, and there was no coercion or intimidation on the part of the tax agents);
United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912 (1970) (a non-
custodial interview was held not to be coercive enough to require Miranda warnings); United
States v. Campione, 416 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1969) (no warnings were required since the taxpayer
was not deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way) ; United States v. Charamella,
294 F. Supp. 280 (D. Del. 1968) (Miranda was interpreted to require custody before the warnings
applied).
'a384 U.S. at 444.
14See United States v. Wainwright, 284 F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); United States v. King-
ry, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 762 (N.D. Fla. 1967) (warnings were required at the first visit by
the special agent).
'5 384 U.S. at 477.
For an expansion of "in custody" to situations outside the station house, see Orozco v. Texas,
394 U.S. 324 (1969), where the defendant was questioned in his bedroom by officers who later
testified they would not have allowed him to leave. The Court held the warnings were required,
pointing to the "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way" language
of Miranda. See also Windsor v. United States, 389 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1968) (the warnings were
required when the defendant was detained in his hotel room).
tions with a civil audit of the taxpayer's records,' conducted by a revenue
agent' whose function is merely to conduct the audit. The revenue agent
thus begins the gathering of information from the taxpayer. If he finds
indications of fraud he notifies the Intelligence Division of the IRS.1'
The Intelligence Division reviews the report, known as a fraud referral,
and decides whether to begin a criminal investigation."0 If one is begun, a
special agent is assigned to the case. The special agent differs from the
revenue agent in that he is a well-trained criminal investigator and not
simply an auditor. 1 He has the power to arrest the taxpayer." The special
agent begins by contacting the taxpayer and interviewing him in a fashion
similar to the revenue agent. These interviews are usually at the taxpayer's
convenience, until the special agent decides to take the taxpayer into
custody.2 ' The significance of the assignment of a special agent is, there-
fore, that at this point the full investigative powers of the IRS have begun
to seek evidence for a possible criminal prosecution."
The courts have not uniformly applied Miranda to criminal tax litiga-
tion. The early cases applied the strict interpretation" and held that in
the absence of custodial interrogation the Miranda warnings were not re-
quired." In Mathis v. United States" the Supreme Court for the first time
required Miranda warnings in a tax fraud case. However, the taxpayer in
Mathis was actually in prison for another offense at the time of his ques-
tioning by a revenue agent. The Court held that when a taxpayer is
actually in custody, Miranda warnings must be given at the inception of
a routine civil audit. After Mathis most courts continued to follow the
strict interpretation of Miranda." However, in United States v. Turzynskf'
a federal district court indicated that compulsion to incriminate one's
self could occur by a combination of the ignorance of one's rights and
the implication by the IRS that the purpose of the interrogation was simply
accurately to determine tax liability. This compulsion was considered just
as real as in custodial interrogation situations. The court held in Turzynski
that the Miranda warnings were required at the first contact by the IRS
with the taxpayer after the investigation had converted from civil to
criminal. More recently and more importantly, the Seventh Circuit held
176 CCH 1970 STAND. FED. TAX REP. 5 5999A.




21 R. SCHMIDT, LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL TAx FRAUD 183-84 (1963).
"INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7608(b) (2) (B).
sAndrews, supra note 11, at 1085.
24Id.
25 See note 11 supra, and accompanying text.
" For a list of cases, see Andrews, supra note 11, at 1088 n.71.
7391 U.S. 1 (1968).
2"Id. at 5.
"1See Marcus v. United States, 422 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Brevik, 422
F.2d 449 (8th Cir. 1970); Simon v. United States, 421 F.2d 667 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 398
U.S. 904 (1970); United States v. Caiello, 420 F.2d 471 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
1039 (1970); United States v. White, 417 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 912
(1970); United States v. Campione, 416 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1969); United States v. Jernigan, 411
F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969).
0 268 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
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in United States v. Dickersona" that Miranda warnings must be given to
a taxpayer under criminal investigation by either the revenue agent or
the special agent upon first contact with the taxpayer after the case has
been transferred to the Intelligence Division. The court noted that because
the taxpayer was not informed of the criminal investigation, he found
himself in a dilemma. Not knowing the possible consequences of his dis-
closures he might have felt obligated to supply information simply to
expedite the determination of any tax deficiency. A rare taxpayer would
know he could refuse to disclose his records to IRS agents, but even he
would probably not know the difference in the functions of a revenue
agent and a special agent." The court concluded: "Incriminating state-
ments elicited in reliance upon the taxpayer's misapprehension as to the
nature of the inquiry, his obligation to respond, and the possible conse-
quences of doing so must be regarded as equally violative of constitutional
protections as a custodial confession extracted without proper warnings
.... " Thus Turzynski and Dickerson announced a new judicial view-
point as to the applicability of Miranda to tax fraud investigations. Few
courts followed this reasoning, but support was found among several legal
commentators. 4
Anticipation of this new viewpoint was evidenced by the publication
of IRS News Releases which indicated internal changes of the procedures
to be followed by IRS agents in tax fraud investigations." The most recent
release since the Mathis decision announced that at the initial meeting a
special agent is required to identify himself, describe his functions, and
advise the taxpayer that anything he says may be used against him, that
he cannot be compelled to incriminate himself by answering questions or
producing documents, and that he has the right to seek the assistance of
an attorney before responding. At first glance this would seem to rid the
courts of the problem of Miranda application to non-custodial tax fraud
investigations. If the IRS is going to require the essence of the warnings
as a matter of policy then there would seem to be no need for a judicial
determination of the requirement of the warnings." However, situations
have arisen in which special agents have not followed these instructions."
Thus, the question of whether the IRS is bound by its own policy state-
ments and procedures has come before the courts. In United States v. Heff-
"413 F.2d 1111 (7th Cir. 1969).32 Id. at 1116.
"3 Id.
3 See Lay, The Effect of Mathis on Right To Counsel in Tax Investigations, 14 VILL. L. REv.
689 (1969); Comment, Fifth Amendment Privilege in Criminal Tax Investigations: Miranda and
the Omnibus Crime Act, 42 TEmp. L.Q. 255 (1969). See also United States v. Wainright, 284
F. Supp. 129 (D. Colo. 1968); United States v. Kingry, 19 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 762 (N.D. Fla.
1967).
" IRS News Release No. 897 (Oct. 3, 1967): "[I]f the criminal aspects of the matter are
not resolved by preliminary inquiry and further investigation becomes necessary the special agent
is required to advise the taxpayer of his Constitutional rights to remain silent and to retain
counsel."
'IRS News Release No. 949 (Nov. 26, 1968).
" The court in Prudden indicated that its holding may be of limited effect since the IRS has
required special agents to give the taxpayer all "essential" Miranda warnings at the initial con-
ference. 424 F.2d at 1030 n.14.
"See United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969).
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ner"9 the Fourth Circuit held that governmental agencies must scrupulously
observe rules of procedure which they have established for themselves.
When they fail to do so, their actions cannot stand, and the courts will
strike them down." However, in United States v. Luna" the western dis-
trict of Texas declined to follow Heffner, saying: "The Constitution and
laws may of necessity dictate preconditions for the admissibility of evi-
dence in a federal trial; administrative agencies may not."' Therefore, the
question of whether Miranda warnings are required in non-custodial tax
fraud investigations is still not clearly answered.'
III. UNITED STATES V. PRUDDEN
In United States v. Prudden" the Fifth Circuit held that Miranda warn-
ings were not required as long as the taxpayer was not deprived of his
freedom and not actually compelled or coerced into furnishing statements
or documents. In so holding, the Fifth Circuit adopted custody as the sole
determinant of compulsion.' The court dwelled at length on the fifth
amendment concept of compulsion. In analyzing Miranda the court was
of the opinion that actual or inherent compulsion must be shown before
the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination requires Miranda
warnings.
According to the court, only when the taxpayer is in custody or de-
prived of his freedom in any significant way can he be said to be under
actual or inherent compulsion. This seems to be overly restrictive, since a
person does not have to be physically restrained in order to feel compelling
psychological pressure. Such compulsion may arise by the confrontation
of a taxpayer with a representative of the Government who presents
himself in such a manner and conducts himself in such a way as to make
the overall situation just as compelling as many custodial interrogations.
At a different level are the psychological pressures an individual may
feel, not as a result of custody or even of the demeanor of the questioning
official, but as a result of his general feeling of uneasiness in confronting
any government agent. No warnings should be required in this type of
situation. The compulsion originated with the individual and not from
a9420 F.2d 809 (4th Cir. 1969).
40The Hefner decision was based on United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S.
260 (1954), wherein the failure of the Board of Immigration and Department of Justice to follow
their own procedures was held to be a violation of due process.
41 313 F. Supp. 1294 (W.D. Tex. 1970).
42Id. at 1295.
' Should Dickerson be adopted by the Supreme Court the problem might arise of the revenue
agent's withholding his fraud referral until he has obtained the incriminating evidence, which pre-
viously had been the pursuit of the special agent. Establishing a point in time at which the warn-
ings attach would then be difficult. See United States v. Davis, 424 F.2d 1241 (5th Cir. 1970).
4424 F.2d 1021 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970).
' The court cited with approval Marcus v. United States, 422 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1970),
United States v. Jernigan, 411 F.2d 471 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 927 (1969), and
Agoranos v. United States, 409 P.2d 833 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 824 (1969), all of
which held that the Miranda doctrine applies only to cases of in-custody interrogation. The court
said that even if Prudden could show that his investigation was one with "dominant criminal
overtones," he could not invoke Miranda because he could not show compulsion. 424 F.2d at 1031.
Based on the court's approval of Marcus, Jernigan, and Agoranos one can only conclude that
custody is the court's sole determinant of compulsion.
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any outside agency. To require warnings in such a situation, which would
apparently be required under the Turzynski and Dickerson holdings,
would also prescribe that the warnings be given at the inception of the
original civil audit, where the revenue agent's main purpose is to determine
the true tax liability of the subject of the investigation. This reasoning
would also require all governmental administrative officials to give full
Miranda warnings every time there is a confrontation with a citizen where
there is the possibility of a criminal prosecution." Such a requirement
would stifle administrative efficiency by requiring additional investigation
for civil information should the citizen decide not to speak, and should
he request an attorney, the expense of providing one in so many instances
would be unbearable. Moreover, the warnings themselves would be re-
duced to such a commonplace level that citizens would begin to pay
them no heed.47
IV. CONCLUSION
The court in United States v. Prudden has ruled that Miranda warn-
ings are required only under compulsive situations, and that compulsion
does not exist outside of actual custody. Therefore, according to Prudden,
a taxpayer being investigated for tax fraud is not under compulsion unless
he is taken into custody, and until that point is reached the investigator
is under no duty to warn him of his constitutional rights. A more reason-
able approach, and one borne out by the Internal Revenue Service's ruling
on the matter," would appear to be to recognize that the pressures of a
tax investigation and the attitude of the investigator may make the tax-
payer feel compelled, if he is not apprised of his rights, to reveal evidence
which could incriminate him in a subsequent trial for tax fraud. In
order to take account of this possibility, the court should allow itself, in
its announced policy of case-by-case determination of the applicability
of Miranda warnings in tax fraud cases," to go beyond the narrow con-
fines of custody in its search for the fundamental element of compulsion.
Thomas R. Matthews
"' The Dickerson reasoning relies on the possibility of criminal prosecution that accompanies an
administrative inquiry. See note 31 supra, and accompanyng text. But such a possibility exists in
varying degrees in most administrative inquiries. Therefore, if the Dickerson reasoning is sound,
it will not admit of degrees and all such inquiries will be covered.
47 Should the government agent be guilty of fraud, deceit, or trickery in obtaining information
from the taxpayer, such information would be inadmissible in a criminal proceeding against the
taxpayer. This was discussed by the court when it said: "While we recognize that fraud, deceit
or trickery in obtaining access to incriminating evidence can make an otherwise lawful search un-
reasonable, Prudden, as the moving party in the motion to suppress, did not sustain the burden
that was his of demonstrating that fraud, deceit or trickery were present." 424 F.2d at 1032.
"' IRS News Release No. 949 (Nov. 26, 1968).
" "In applying Miranda's rule, this Circuit has taken a case-by-case approach. ... 424 F.2d
at 1030.
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